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The road to the dock: prosecution decision-making in medical manslaughter 
cases 
 




There has been concern in the last few years in England and Wales about the 
imposition of criminal liability for negligently causing death in a health care context. 
It has been asserted that prosecution rates are increasing1 and that the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) is now much more willing to prosecute than it was in the 
past.2 Concern has been heightened as research has shown that prosecutors, judges 
and juries all struggle with the ill defined concept of gross negligence, and there is no 
evidence that prosecutions have improved patient safety or accountability. 
Furthermore, as the test for gross negligence manslaughter is an ‘objective’ one, there 
need be no evidence of subjective culpability (which is often seen as synonymous 
with ‘moral’ culpability). Such problems have led to calls to raise the bar of liability 
by, for example, creating a subjective recklessness test or a more substantive test for 
‘gross negligence’.3 In this paper we examine the nature of medical manslaughter 
                                                           
1
 O. Quick ‘Prosecuting “Gross” Medical Negligence: Manslaughter, Discretion, and the Crown 
Prosecution Service’ (2006) 33 Journal of Law and Society 421-450. 
2
 R. Ferner and S. McDowell, ‘Doctors charged with manslaughter in the course of medical practice, 
1795-2005: a literature review’ (2006) 99 J. of the Royal Society of Medicine 309.  
3
 See, for example, O. Quick ‘Medicine, Mistakes and Manslaughter: a Criminal Combination?’ (2010) 
69 Cambridge Law Journal 186. 
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cases, analyse the decisions of prosecutors in these cases, and assess whether the tests 
for manslaughter (even if modified in the ways suggested above) are workable in the 
medical context.4 First we need to understand how these cases arise in the first place. 
Criminal investigations into medical deaths have three main sources: relatives 
making complaints to the police directly, a hospital contacting the police, or a coroner 
becoming concerned that there is some something unnatural or suspicious about a 
death and referring it to CID. Analysis of inquest files over a ten-year period from 
three Coroner’s Offices shows a threefold increase in complaints to coroners and the 
police from relatives of deceased people about standards of medical treatment. The 
files also show that coroners and the police respond to, and pursue investigations into, 
medical deaths more frequently than they used to. Even if there is no subsequent 
criminal charge, police investigations and inquests into medical deaths are now also 
much more likely to be held than they were ten or more years ago. Inquests into 
medical deaths in 2004-2008 were almost double the number in 1999-2003.5 
                                                           
4
 Research for this article has been developed as part of an Arts and Humanities Research Council 
(AHRC) funded project entitled ‘The Impact of the Criminal Process on Health Care Ethics and 
Practice’, based at the Universities of Manchester, Lancaster and Birmingham. The support of the 
AHRC is gratefully acknowledged. See 
http://www.law.manchester.ac.uk/research/hccriminalprocess/index.html. We also thank the CPS, and 
in particular prosecutors based in Special Crime and Counter Terrorism Division (SCCTD), formerly 
the Special crime Division (SCD), for the help they gave us in providing access to files and facilities, 
and who gave considerable time talking with us, commenting on this paper and joining our discussions. 
The paper would not exist without the help of the CPS – the informal help as much as the formal 
access. Nothing in this paper is, however, necessarily endorsed by CPS. 
5
 Analysis of the early decision making process in cases of medical error was conducted as part of the 
AHRC research and examined the factors influencing the attrition of a case as it proceeded through the 
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Once the police have begun an investigation they either refer the case to the 
CPS for advice or investigate fully and then refer the case to the CPS. The CPS was 
established in 1986 under the Prosecution of Offences Act 2005. Under the Act, 
investigation and prosecution were spilt, with the former being the duty of the police 
and the latter the CPS in order to try to achieve improved consistency and 
accountability, but the decision whether or not to prosecute was left with the police. 
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 transferred this decision to the CPS in virtually all 
cases. However, if, after some investigation, the police decide there is insufficient 
evidence to prosecute, they need not refer the case to the CPS in most cases.6 
 Decisions whether to prosecute are guided by the Code for Crown Prosecutors 
which sets out a two stage test. The first is whether there is sufficient evidence 
(defined as a realistic prospect for conviction). The second is whether prosecution is 
in the public interest. The Code specifies that the more serious the offence the more 
likely it is that it will be in the public interest to prosecute. So, where homicide is 
concerned, only in cases where there are exceptionally extenuating circumstances 
(assisted dying provides most of the examples) 7 will it be decided that the public 
interest requires no prosecution. In this paper we look only at the evidential stage as 
we found no cases where the CPS believed there was sufficient evidence yet explicitly 
exercised their discretion, on public interest grounds, not to prosecute. Whether they 
                                                                                                                                                                      
criminal process. See D. Griffiths ‘Medical Manslaughter and the Decision Making Process: Discretion 
and Attrition’ (unpublished). 
6
 Discussed more fully in A. Sanders (this volume) and A. Sanders, R. Young and M. Burton, Criminal 
Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2010) Ch. 7. 
7
 For discussion see A. Mullock, ‘Overlooking the Criminally Compassionate’ (2010) 18 Med LR 442; 
R. Bennett and S. Ost (ed.) (CUP 2012); A. Sanders (this volume). 
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ever implicitly did do will be considered in section 4, for as we show in section 2 
below, discretion can often be disguised as ‘judgement’ about evidential sufficiency.  
 The Special Crime Division (SCD) of the CPS was established in 2005 (and 
became SCCTD in April 2011) to handle the most sensitive and complex cases across 
the country, and to provide advice to investigating bodies such as the police and 
Health and Safety Executive and to other prosecutors within local CPS offices. As 
‘medical manslaughter’ is such a specialised area of crime, SCD is expected to take a 
more active role in guiding these investigations than in most other criminal cases. 
Thus the CPS asks the police to consult SCD well before the question of any criminal 
charge for medical manslaughter (MM) arises.8 This is to ensure that a) the case 
warrants further investigation; and b) (if it does) lines of enquiry are directed to 
establishing whether or not there is evidence in relation to the elements of MM 
(discussed below). Ideally, advice will be given at an early stage on the legal tests that 
need to be met and the appropriate experts from whom to seek expert reports. 
Whether the police follow this advice is up to the police themselves and it seems that 
the police did not always follow up lines of enquiry suggested by CPS in cases that 
were not pursued (see section 4 (a)). The greater problem was that sometimes the 
police carried out full investigations before consulting the CPS, and thereby 
inadvertently set some cases on lengthy paths that could not lead to successful 
prosecutions, even though this might not have been the result had they been properly 
advised at an earlier stage. For example, we came across a case where inappropriate 
experts were instructed by the police and the case was closed due to the experts’ 
advice that the breach in question would not reach the gross threshold. At the 
                                                           
8
 No specific protocol exists which instructs the police to refer a case to the SCCTD although it is 
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subsequent Inquest, a coroner challenged the decision not to prosecute on the basis 
that other more appropriate experts would probably have come to different decision, 
however this was eight years after the incident occurred when vital evidence had been 
destroyed and key witnesses had died. Once the investigation is complete a member 
of SCD decides whether or not to prosecute (and, if so, who to prosecute) and 
compiles a detailed ‘review note’ which explains that decision in detail. 
 A related background issue concerns the ‘right to life’ under Article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Human Rights Act 1998 in 
effect incorporated the ECHR into English law. Article 2 has been interpreted to mean 
that public bodies (such as the police and CPS) are obliged to conduct investigations 
that are as full as practical in order to establish who may have been responsible for 
any deaths.9 Part of the rationale for SCD is that it deals with the difficult ‘right to 
life’ cases (that is, including deaths in custody, assisted suicide, corporate 
manslaughter). 
 Because of the Article 2 obligations, the police and CPS feel obliged to 
investigate more such cases, including ‘medical manslaughter’, than they might 
otherwise do: given that, as in all organisations, there is no infinite supply of 
resources, the police and CPS would normally decide whether particular cases should 
be allocated resources on the basis of a combination of factors such as seriousness and 
probability of securing sufficient evidence to prosecute. Article 2 also makes it 
difficult to adopt a nuanced approach to the depth of investigation: a full investigation 
is required unless and until it is clear that there is insufficient evidence. We shall see 
that this means that many cases are investigated for more extensively than would 
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 Avsar v. Turkey (2001) 37 EHRR 1014; Ramsahai [2008] 46 EHRR 43. For a recent example see R 
(on the application of JL) v. Home Secretary [2009] 1 AC 588. 
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seem to be warranted, as the probability of securing sufficient evidence will vary from 
case to case. An SCD prosecutor told us that when she had previously worked on 
sexual assault cases she was given far less time for those cases than she had for SCD 
cases that were usually going nowhere. Doubtless this accounts for at least some of 
the increase in medical-death investigations, their duration, and the number of 
suspects in them, creating more of a shadow over health care professionals (HCPs) 
than there would otherwise be. In taking up so many resources, even less is then 
available for other cases, even serious ones such as sexual assault. The problem is 
compounded by many police investigators failing to consult SCD at an early stage. 
Early consultation allows SCD to advise on what lines of enquiry are needed, 
allowing some investigations to be cut short when if it becomes apparent that there is 
no possibility of prosecuting anyone. 
 The way Article 2 has been interpreted also means that many coronial 
investigations are more extensive than they would otherwise be. Since the police 
prepare many full files for this purpose, they submit these files to the CPS for 
prosecution decisions. Much of the content is not needed for such decisions, but as it 
has been gathered anyway it provides useful background information for the CPS 
reviewer. 
 
2. The uncertainty of gross negligence manslaughter and medical manslaughter 
 
Homicide law in England and Wales forms a ladder of offences of descending 
severity: 
 
1) Murder: causing death with the intention of doing so or of causing GBH 
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2) Manslaughter  
a) Voluntary: where the charge would be murder were it not for a 
partial defence (e.g. diminished responsibility due to a cognitive 
problem on the part of the defendant); or 
b) Constructive: causing death by doing an act (or, perhaps, omission) 
that is criminal and that requires intention or recklessness and which is 
liable to cause some harm (though not necessarily serious harm); or 
c) Gross negligence: causing death by breaching a duty of care to the 
deceased; this breach must be an act (or omission) that is grossly 
negligent, and death must be reasonably foreseeable; or 
d) Reckless: although there have been no reported cases charged as 
such for many years, as it is difficult to think of a circumstance where 
recklessly caused death will not fall into one of the other categories of 
manslaughter, there is general agreement that this category does exist 
in theory.10 Indeed, many cases charged as murder but where a plea to 
manslaughter is accepted or where the jury only convicts of 
manslaughter probably come into this category.11 The idea is picked up 
by Quick, as we shall see in section 5. 
3) Lesser homicide offences such as death by dangerous driving (RTA 1988, 
section 1) and death by careless driving when intoxicated (RTA 1988, section 
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 See e.g. Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter (Report No. 237, 1996) para. 2.26; Clarkson, 
Keating and Cunningham, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2010), p. 
644; J. Herring, Criminal Law Cases and Materials (Oxford: OUP, 2010), p. 277. 
11
 C. Clarkson, ‘Context and culpability in involuntary manslaughter’, in A. Ashworth and B. Mitchell 
eds., Rethinking English Homicide Law (Oxford: OUP, 2000). 
Bioethics, medicine and the criminal law: v2: Medicine, Crime and Society. Sanders, A. & 
Griffiths, D. (eds.). Cambridge University Press,p. 117-158 
3A as amended by RTA 1991). 
 
There is also corporate homicide under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act 2007, which does not fit into this hierarchical ladder as it covers a 
potentially very wide range of homicides.12 
‘Medical manslaughter’ (MM) is not a technical term, but is a form of gross 
negligence manslaughter (GNM: 2) (c) above). MM refers to medically qualified 
individuals who are performing acts within the terms of their duty of care, when an 
act or omission allegedly causing death occurs. 
The leading cases on GNM are Adomako13 and Misra14 which, by coincidence, 
are both MM cases. Several elements need to be proven for GNM: 
 
a) the existence of a duty of care to the deceased; 
b) a breach of that duty of care which; 
c) causes (or significantly contributes) to the death of the victim; and 
d) ‘whether the extent to which the defendant’s misconduct departed from the 
proper standard of care … involving as it must have done, a risk of death to 
the patient, was such that it should be judged criminal …’ (the ‘gross 
negligence’ element).15 
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 For discussion see Wells (this volume). 
13
 [1995] 1 AC 171. 
14
 [2005] 1 Cr App R 21 
15
 R v. Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171 at 187. 
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Establishing the existence of a duty is rarely problematic in MM cases. In most MM 
cases it is also evident whether a duty was breached (unlike in many other GNM 
situations, such as where drugs are supplied to a friend).16 Although we shall see that 
around thirty percent of MM non-prosecutions are because no breach could be 
established, in only half of these (i.e. fifteen percent of the total) is this because no 
breach can be established at all; in the other half it is not clear who breached their 
duty (see section 4 (c) below). However, we shall see in section 4 that the other 
elements often are problematic. Causation is a particular problem in MM cases. And 
‘gross negligence’ is an intrinsically elusive concept that is problematic in all types of 
GNM case: in Adomako Lord MacKay said that whether a breach of duty 
 
… should be characterised as gross negligence and therefore as a 
crime … will depend on the seriousness of the breach of duty 
committed by the defendant in all the circumstances in which the 
defendant was placed… The essence of the matter which is 
supremely a jury question is whether, having respect to the risk of 
death involved, the conduct of the defendant was so bad in all the 
circumstances as to amount in their judgment to a criminal act or 
omission.17 
 
This is as close to a definition of ‘gross negligence’ as we have. Brazier and Allen 
note that 
                                                           
16
 See e.g. C. Clarkson and S. Cunningham (eds.), Criminal Liability for Non-Aggressive Death 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008) (Chapter by Wilson). 
17
   R v. Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171 at 187. 
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In practice, it seems that the offence of gross negligence 
manslaughter, as it stands, involves circularity; juries being told in 
effect to convict of a crime if they think a crime has been 
committed.18 
 
Circularity was a frequent criticism of the Bateman test of gross negligence,19 on 
which the test in Adomako is based. A type of homicide that has been criticised so 
frequently and so consistently yet which was affirmed – largely unchanged – seventy 
years after first being formulated seems curiously indispensible. 
The test for gross negligence manslaughter is objective. Disregard and 
recklessness are not required for conviction. Cases involving a momentary (but major) 
error with no evidence of recklessness or disregard, such as miscalculating the dose of 
diamorphine, have therefore resulted in conviction.20 Thus caring doctors who do 
their best for patients but who make a terrible mistake have found themselves cast into 
the criminal process. Dr Sullman and Dr Prentice were junior doctors who had their 
case heard in the House of Lords at the same time as Adomako. They made the error 
of injecting vincristine into the spine of their patient, having been put in the position 
                                                           
18
 M. Brazier and N. Allen, ‘Criminalising Medical Malpractice’ in C. Erin and S. Ost, The Criminal 
Justice System and Health Care (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 21. This is a common 
criticism. See e.g. Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter, para. 3.9; discussion in J. Herring, 
Criminal Law Cases and Materials (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 291-8. 
19
 R v. Bateman (1925) Cr App R 8. See criticism by, for example, G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal 
Law (London: Stevens, 1983); successive editions of J. Smith and B. Hogan, Criminal Law (Oxford: 
OUP). 
20
 E.g. R v. Becker (2000) WL 877688. 
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of administering such treatment untrained and unsupervised. The error was fatal, and 
the sixteen year old patient died some days later in agony. It is true that the judge at 
their trial expressly told them that they were not ‘bad men’.21 And indeed Dr Sullman 
and Dr Prentice had their convictions quashed by the Court of Appeal. Now it has 
been suggested in Rowley that  
 
It is clear from what Lord Mackay said [in Adomako] that there is a fifth 
ingredient: criminality … or ‘badness’. Using the word ‘badness’, the jury 
must be sure that the defendant’s conduct was so bad in all the circumstances 
to amount ‘to a criminal act or omission’.22 
 
However, it would be wrong to conclude that the defendant must be ‘bad’ – i.e. 
subjectively culpable – in order to satisfy this test. Whilst a defendant’s recklessness 
may be one of the ‘circumstances’ that forms part of the evidence that negligence was 
‘gross’, subjective recklessness is not a requirement. Thus as far as ‘the law’ is 
concerned (in the strict black-letter sense) it is hard to see how this really is an 
additional test. Indeed, neither the Law Commission23 nor the standard textbooks that 
we scrutinised for this purpose24 mention Rowley which is, after all, a rather obscure 
challenge to a decision not to prosecute for MM. And in no other discussions of GNM 
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 R v. Prentice; R v. Sullman [1994] QB 302. 
22
 Rowley v. DPP (2003) EWHC Admin 693 per Kennedy LJ. 
23
  Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter, para. 2.10. 
24
 E.g. A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009); J. Herring, Criminal Law Cases 
and Materials (Oxford: OUP, 2010). 
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have we seen mention of a ‘fifth test’.25 In Misra, the leading MM case since 
Adomako, 
 
The jury concluded that the conduct of each appellant in the course of 
performing his professional obligations to his patient was ‘truly exceptionally 
bad’, and showed a high degree of indifference to an obvious and serious risk 
to the patient’s life. Accordingly, along with the other ingredients of the 
offence, gross negligence too, was proved.26 
 
There are three points to note here: first, it is the conduct, not the defendant or his/her 
mental state, that must be ‘truly exceptionally bad’; second, this ‘badness’ seems to be 
relevant to the Court of Appeal in respect of proof of gross negligence and ‘the other 
ingredients of the offence’ not as a ‘5th test’; third, no ‘5th test’ was mentioned in the 
judgement. And to take a more recent case at random, in Evans27 the four Adomako 
tests were put to the jury and this was endorsed by the Court of Appeal. 
Prosecutors in SCD drew Rowley’s ‘fifth test’ to our attention because they 
rely on it heavily, it being drawn to their attention by the DPP’s Legal Guidance to 
                                                           
25
 Quick alone refers to Rowley. He draws attention to the endorsement in that case and in Misra of the 
use of evidence of subjective recklessness by Lord Mackay in Adomako (though this is not required). 
But he does not identify any ‘5th test’. See O. Quick, ‘Medical manslaughter: The rise (and 
replacement) of a contested crime?’ in C Erin and S Ost, The Criminal Justice System and Health Care 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
26
 R v. Misra [2005] 1 Cr App R 21 at para. 66, per Judge LJ 
27
 R v. Evans [2009] 2 Cr App R 10. Also see R v. Connolly [2007] 2 Cr App R (S) 82, where Misra 
and the Adomako tests were discussed and applied but no ‘5th test’ was mentioned. 
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Crown Prosecutors on homicide.28 Prosecutors also rely heavily on the obligation to 
consider ‘all the circumstances’ highlighted in the judgements in Rowley and in 
Misra. But this is a meaningless obligation. Presumably prosecutors, judges and juries 
are not being asked to consider irrelevant circumstances. But, logically, no-one should 
need to be told to consider all relevant circumstances, for to fail to do so would by 
definition be failing to make a full consideration. The result of the ‘5th test’ and of 
being asked to do something that need not be stated is that prosecutors seem, as we 
shall see in section 4, to strain for something over and above objective gross 
negligence. What, in another context, might seem to be evidence of recklessness can 
be regarded as ‘bad’ and a relevant ‘circumstance’ justifying the view that there is 
sufficient evidence of gross negligence to justify prosecution; while what, in another 
context, might seem to be a mitigating factor comes to be seen as a ‘circumstance’ 
that makes the action less ‘bad’ and thus justifying the view that there is insufficient 
evidence of gross negligence to justify prosecution. 
Despite the objective nature of the gross negligence test, in many reported 
cases the doctors who are prosecuted did seem to act recklessly: for example, the two 
doctors who, over a period of two days, ignored warnings and failed to act on 
evidence that their patient was critically ill.29 And in section 4 we shall see that this 
was true of all the (admittedly few) prosecuted cases in our sample. The ‘fifth 
ingredient’, if it really should be characterised as such, of ‘badness’ does therefore 
seem to exercise some power in reality, particularly when coupled with the obligation 
                                                           
28
 Prosecutors in SCD strongly suggested to us that ‘badness’ in a general sense – that we found 
difficult to understand as other than subjective recklessness – is needed. 
www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/homicide_murder_and_manslaughter/index.html. 
29
 R v. Misra [2005] 1 Cr App R 21 
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to consider ‘all the circumstances’: to emphasise the grossness required of the 
negligence, such that a momentary slip would have to be something the absolutely 
overwhelming majority of defendants would never do if they had the training, and 
were in the circumstances, of the defendant; and to sensitise prosecutors to what they 
perceive to be a requirement of more broadly-defined ‘badness’ than was evident 
from the judgement in Adomako. 
A classic example is the case of two patients who died as a result of being 
given a cancer drug that was five hundred percent too concentrated. This happened 
because a) the prescribing doctor, Dr Tawana, did not specify the brand of the drug, a 
crucial error since different brands came in different concentrations; and b) the nurses 
administering the drug did not heed the warning on the drug containers to check that 
the dosage was appropriate. On the face of it this was gross negligence on the part of 
all three because the drug was known to be highly toxic in large quantities, and so 
they would or should have known that there was a risk of death if a mistake of this 
kind was made. The police investigated and consulted CPS over a MM prosecution, 
but CPS declined to prosecute, despite this clearly being no momentary slip.30 
The vagueness of the ‘gross negligence’ and ‘badness’ tests (such as they are) 
leads a substantial reliance on the judgement and opinion – or as some prosecutors 
told Quick, ‘gut instinct’31 – of the prosecutor and the specialists (usually doctors) 
instructed to be expert witnesses.32 Thus prosecutors who wish to prosecute only 
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 Birmingham Post Late, 13 July 2010. 
31
 Quick ‘Prosecuting “Gross” Medical Negligence’, 440. 
32
 O. Quick ‘Expert Evidence and Medical Manslaughter: Vagueness in Action’ (2011) 38 Journal of 
Law and Society 496. 
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where they find subjective recklessness are able to do follow their preference. 33 
Quick found that prosecutors and expert witnesses struggle to define their 
understanding of ‘gross’ and that the ‘prosecution recipe’ for gross negligence 
manslaughter is still kept secret. The results are gross uncertainty for health care 
professionals,34 potential inconsistency; and, we shall argue, discretion based on 
‘public interest’ considerations (such as blameworthiness) but hidden under the guise 
of a determination that the negligence was insufficiently gross. Before looking at our 
data in detail there are three general criticisms of GNM in general (and MM in 
particular) that we need to tackle. 
 
a) Moral luck 
 
Medical negligence only becomes a crime if the patient dies.35 So a health care 
professional can make the most horrific error and yet escape criminal liability if the 
patient survives the mishap (as in the Jamie Merrett case discussed in section 5). 
Indeed, it is likely that only a minority of life-risking negligent error actually leads to 
death. Luck plays a large part in relation to causation too: no matter how grossly 
negligent an act may be, if the perpetrator is lucky enough to find that an intervening 
cause breaks the chain of causation, there will be no criminal liability. We shall see 
that in many MM cases death could have been caused by many factors, frequently 
                                                           
33
 See O. Quick, ‘Medical Manslaughter: The Rise (and Replacement) of a Contested Crime’. 
34
 See O. Quick (2007) op cit. Although, as will already be evident, in reality there are prosecutions 
only in the worst cases. 
35
 See M. Brazier and A. Alghrani ‘Fatal medical malpractice and criminal liability’ (2009) 
Professional Negligence 49-67.  
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making it impossible to determine whether the suspect was the, or even a substantial, 
‘cause’ of death. Unlike other forms of homicide, in most cases of GNM there is no 
‘lesser included’ offence.36 We shall see in section 4 that this is quite a common 
problem. This means that people who are prosecutable for GNM are very unlucky. It 
is often said that it is therefore unfair to prosecute them. However, rather than taking 
away the possibility of successful prosecution in such cases, would it not be more 
rational to create the legal conditions to successfully prosecute those who endanger 
life and/or cause great suffering but cannot be proven to have ended life, if these 
defendants are culpable. We discuss a possible crime of negligently causing injury or 
negligent endangerment in section 5. But the crucial question is ‘if these defendants 
are culpable’. 
 
b) Is negligence culpable? 
 
For decades there has been a wide-ranging debate about the place of negligence (as 
against subjective recklessness or intent) in criminal liability in general.37 The classic 
view is that mala in se (that is, real crimes) require subjective knowledge or intent, 
and that negligence should be the basis of liability only for mala prohibita (regulatory 
offences, behaviours that are not intrinsically bad). Thus negligence is, according to 
this argument, an unsuitable basis for liability for serious crimes such as manslaughter 
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that are on a par with other serious offences against the person that are clearly mala in 
se. However, the mala in se/mala prohibita distinction is a way of thinking, not a 
fundamental element of civilised law, or even of English law.38 Even if we accept that 
this way of thinking does underlie English law, there is no consensus on what 
constitutes ‘subjective fault’: Duff, for example, argues that indifference towards a 
foreseeable outcome – which is effectively what is at issue in many MM cases – is a 
subjective fault.39 There is also no consensus on many specifics e.g. what is, and is 
not ‘intrinsically’ bad. Marital rape, for example, was only criminalised in 1992,40 so 
this was a clearly contested category twenty to thirty years ago. And many regulatory 
offences such as pollution, tax evasion and causing injuries through unsafe work 
conditions are increasingly regarded as worse than many ‘real’ crimes such as theft.41 
So if negligence is an acceptable basis for liability for these crimes, why not for 
manslaughter? 
One answer is that if these are indeed serious crimes, negligence should not be 
the basis of liability, for negligence is simply not a culpable state of mind.42 The 
argument is that one cannot be blamed for that which one did not know or intend. 
This argument may be valid for momentary carelessness, whether by act or omission. 
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But greater or more sustained negligence – for things that one ought to know because, 
for example, one is engaging in particularly risky behaviour – is a different matter. 
Take doctors or nurses who are unduly fatigued, perhaps because of unwarranted 
demands put on them by NHS cuts and hospital management. As Clarkson points out, 
choosing to treat patients in these circumstances is a knowing choice even if fatal 
errors causing death were unforeseen.43 Or, where error is a known risk (such as the 
maladministration of drugs), systems are needed to guard against it.44 Culpability 
often lies in the prior failures, not the error itself. The key here is the use of phrases 
like ‘great’, ‘sustained’ and ‘particularly risky’. Only where such phrases apply can 
we consider negligence to be gross. To adapt one of Horder’s arguments, when one 
deliberately adopts a course of action that creates a risk ‘I make my own luck’ in the 
sense that one decides how to guard against the risk created.45 This is particularly 
apposite in the medical context. 
An examination of the objections to GNM in general, and to MM in particular, 
shows that even the most informed commentators often fail to appreciate these 
subtleties. Merry and McCall Smith dichotomise the problem into ‘errors’ which they 
argue are not morally culpable; and violations which – because they are deliberate – 
are culpable.46 Montgomery uses this crude objective/subjective dichotomy to 
similarly argue that MM has gone too far, or should even be abolished, as ‘justice 
does not require the use of the criminal law in the case of medical mistakes, but only 
                                                           
43
 Clarkson ‘Context and culpability in involuntary manslaughter’. 
44
 A. Leopold, ‘A case for criminal negligence’ (2010) Law and Philosophy 455. 
45
 J. Horder, ‘A critique of the correspondence principle in criminal law’ (1995) Crim LR 759 at 764; 
and see Clarkson and Cunningham Criminal Liability for Non-Aggressive Death, p. 5. 
46
 A. Merry and A. McCall Smith, Errors, Medicine, and the Law (Cambridge: CUP 2001). 
Bioethics, medicine and the criminal law: v2: Medicine, Crime and Society. Sanders, A. & 
Griffiths, D. (eds.). Cambridge University Press,p. 117-158 
where professionals set out to do wrong.’ This is because: ‘Criminalisation is not 
appropriate for those who try to do the right thing, but fail, only for those who set out 
to disregard the value of life that is protected by the criminal law.’47 But how should 
the anaesthetist in Adomako be characterised, where an oxygen tube was dislodged for 
4 minutes before he noticed? No-one accused him of ‘setting out to do wrong’ but he 
nonetheless could be said to have ‘disregarded the value of life’. It is true that he was 
unduly fatigued, but this was not even a case of undue demands by the ruthless NHS 
as it appears that his lack of sleep was due to working at two different hospitals. 
Similarly what should we say about those who ‘cared’ for Lisa Sharpe by letting a 
drip run dry and not performing a blood test for a week despite blood samples having 
been taken due to persistent vomiting?48 
Tadros, on the other hand, does appear to accept Duff’s gloss on the 
objective/subjective dichotomy, insofar as he distinguishes between ‘lack of ability’ 
and ‘lack of care’. He criticises GNM because, he argues, it penalises both.49 
However, we know of no modern cases where this is so. Surely Adomako (the case he 
cites to support his argument) is a case of ‘lack of care’ rather than ‘lack of ability’. 
And even if ‘lack of ability’ or momentary slips were criminalised at one time, it is no 
longer the case in the wake of Misra. 
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There is therefore no clear basis on which to object to criminal liability for 
failure to guard against foreseeable risks of great magnitude or probability, or for 
gross carelessness for a sustained length of time. So, while it may be that simple 
negligence is not culpable and should not be the basis of criminal liability (we take no 
position on this), gross negligence is another matter entirely. The objection rests on a 
‘distinction between “purposeful” and “chance” outcomes [that] is not always helpful 
in determining responsibility.’ Keating reached this conclusion sixteen years ago, 50 
and if more heed had been taken of it, the debate would be far further advanced. 
 
c) Can negligent behaviour be deterred? 
 
Culpability is the main concern of retributivists.51 They seek to criminalise that 
which deserves punishment regardless of the effect of that process. Most academics 
and policy-makers are, however, also concerned with ‘forward-looking’ justifications 
for criminalising and punishing behaviour; in other words, the prevention of 
misconduct is a major concern. This is another ground of attack by opponents of 
negligence-based liability. Is it possible to deter people from failing to consider that 
which they should have considered? Merry argues that medical errors not done with 
subjective intent cannot generally be prevented through rational reflection, except in 
the worst cases. Hence the threat of criminal prosecution is seen as ineffectual. 52 
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However, doubt was cast on this view by Hart in 1968 and many others since. 53 As 
any parent knows, much of what we say to our children falls on deaf ears. But do we 
really believe that our frequent demand that they ‘Be more careful’ is both 
philosophically incoherent and always ineffectual? We can all learn to be more 
careful, and hopefully medical practitioners learn this lesson better than most. If the 
threat of prosecution helps us to learn, it will not be ineffective. And it is vital to 
remember that, as stressed above, the threshold for liability is gross negligence, not 
simple negligence. It is only the ‘worst’ cases that come into the frame. 
Notwithstanding this, many cases deemed not to be ‘gross’ like that of Dr Tawana 
(above) are also clearly deterable: it is a classic example of where if the warning ‘be 
more careful’ had been heeded, lives would not have been lost. The reason why 
Merry’s view differs so markedly from ours is that he subscribes to the 
objective/subjective dichotomy discussed above. As he observes, we all make errors 
sometimes, so error cannot be regarded as culpable or deterable. This might make 
sense if the only alternative to accidental ‘error’ is deliberate ‘violation’, but as we 
have seen, the reality is more complex than this. 
More generally, Ashworth notes that the deterrent efficacy of prosecution in 
general is often over-estimated and this is particularly so in medical error cases 
where there is no deliberate wrong-doing and most professionals will have many 
reasons for trying to be careful.54 So far there is little evidence to suggest that 
previous prosecutions for medical manslaughter have improved patient safety or the 
systems failures which lead to fatal errors. For instance, despite the highly publicised 
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case of Drs Prentice and Sullman, the fatal mistake of accidentally administrating 
vincristine into a patient’s spine arose again in 2001 resulting in the death of an 
eighteen-year old outpatient, Wayne Jowett, who had been in remission from 
leukemia. It was reported to be the thirty-sixth incident of a fatal injection of 
vincristine worldwide.55 
We should not make the mistake of assuming that the only reasons for 
criminalisation are retribution and deterrence. Forward-looking justifications can aim 
at reducing crime by other means. Restorative justice (RJ) is one that is used for 
minor crime, and juvenile offenders in particular, but rarely for more serious crime. 
We briefly examine this in section 5. 
There may be other reasons for a small deterrent effect. First, those doctors 
who are convicted very rarely go to gaol. Indeed, some return to practise.56 However, 
the criminal law is used far more frequently in medical cases in France than in the 
UK, and a fine and/or a suspended prison sentence is regarded as sufficient: the 
ultimate punishment is seen to lie in just the stigma of a criminal conviction itself.57 
The second, and more plausible, reason for the minimal deterrent effect of the 
criminal law is a very low prosecution and conviction rate (due in part because the 
punitive nature of our criminal justice is widely thought to be inappropriate for 
MM).58 There is no point even considering the deterrent effect of sentencing if one is 
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unlikely to ever reach the sentencing stage. However, the assertion that prosecutions 
are rare is controversial, and it is to this issue that we now turn. Meanwhile, by way of 
conclusion to the debate over negligence liability for homicide, as even many of those 
who object to GNM acknowledge, this has to be regarded as an ongoing debate, not a 
closed issue.59 
 
3. Trends in prosecutions for medical manslaughter by gross negligence 
 
Ferner and McDowell argue that doctors have been more likely to be prosecuted for 
medical error since 1990 than previously.60 They base this conclusion on media 
reports that identified just seven prosecutions against doctors for gross negligence 
manslaughter between 1945 and 1990, compared with thirty-eight between 1995 and 
2005. Even when prosecutions were more frequent in the more distant past (e.g. 1835-
1890 and 1925-1935) they discovered fewer than one prosecution each year on 
average.  
This apparent increase in prosecutions needs to be situated within wider 
debates about a decline in public trust in professions in general.61 There is, in 
particular, an increasing awareness of the limits of the once hallowed health care 
                                                           
59
 Quick (2007) op cit. 
60
 See Ferner and McDowell, ‘Doctors charged with manslaughter’. 
61
 A. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Polity Press: 
Cambridge, 1991). See also O. O’Neil, A Question of Trust: 2002 BBC Reith Lectures (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2002). 
Bioethics, medicine and the criminal law: v2: Medicine, Crime and Society. Sanders, A. & 
Griffiths, D. (eds.). Cambridge University Press,p. 117-158 
profession, and revelations that mistakes and incompetence are all too common.62 
Stories of patient safety scandals63 and incompetent doctors64 have proliferated in the 
past ten years. Andrew Ashworth notes that: 
 
…the contours of English criminal law are ‘historically 
contingent’—not the product of any principled inquiry or 
consistent application of certain criteria, but largely dependent on 
the fortunes of successive governments, on campaigns in the mass 
media, on the activities of various pressure groups and so forth.65  
 
Debates about the perceived increase in medical manslaughter prosecutions have 
indeed linked the wider culture of distrust to an increased propensity for criminal 
justice agencies, particularly the CPS, to lower their evidential threshold in these cases 
and proceed with a prosecution, in order to serve political purposes and show that 
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‘justice has been done’. Frequently concern for the victim is invoked to justify 
prosecutions that might not otherwise have taken place.66 And according to Quick: 
 
This increase of prosecutions has occurred within the broader 
context of rising complaints against health care professionals and 
the accompanying media attention to the costs of medical mistakes. 
Prosecutors work within this climate of increased suspicion of 
professionals which is likely to impact on the ‘frames’ they adopt 
in exercising their discretion.67 
 
Commenting on the low conviction rate in medical manslaughter cases, Ferner and 
McDowell concluded that the CPS charges too many cases and asserts that this is 
because it is ‘an emotionally satisfying way to exact retribution’ rather than a concern 
to protect patients.68 
Prosecutors argue that their decisions are based on the law and on the 
interpretations of/elaborations on the law set out in documents such as the Code for 
Crown Prosecutors and not because of emotion or political pressure. And, as we have 
seen, even the discretion to not prosecute on ‘public interest’ grounds that they do 
allow themselves in most cases is eschewed in most homicide cases. But we have also 
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seen that the ‘gross negligence’ test is too vague to act as a legal straitjacket. Indeed, 
‘The CPS has told us that prosecutors find it difficult to judge when to bring a 
prosecution …’.69 So, prosecutors who wish to exercise discretion to prosecute when 
the evidence is ‘thin’, for example, will often be able to do so on the basis that 
drawing the evidential sufficiency line in such cases is a matter of judgement on 
which opinions can legitimately differ. So the mere existence of apparently strict legal 
rules does not negate the claims of Ferner and McDowell. In reality, those rules allow 
prosecutors considerable leeway. However, our data does cast doubt on the claims of 
increased prosecutions or, at least, of the lowering of the de facto prosecution 
threshold. There are several reasons to doubt these claims: 
 
a) No evidence of an increase in prosecutions 
 
Due to the ways in which cases are filed and stored, both we and the CPS lack data to 
show any reliable trends in medical manslaughter cases (see the appendix on 
methodology). However, in cases that the Medical Defence Union had dealt with over 
the past ten years, only five cases went to trial, of which three resulted in conviction70. 
And in our trawl of all SCD cases over the six years 2004-9, of the seventy-five 
possible cases there were only four completed prosecutions, of which two ended in 
conviction.71 So on what did Ferner and McDowell base their claims of increased 
prosecutions? They were actually based on a search of newspaper reports. Ferner and 
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McDowell could identify only one prosecution of a doctor between 1935 and 1975, 
for example. Is it really credible that there was only one such prosecution? Surely 
not.72 This is not a reliable source of data, as media content is of course highly 
selective, driven by consumer, social, political and economic interests.73 We could 
find no media coverage of many of the medical manslaughter investigations that we 
have looked at within the CPS, and have found that some prosecutions, particularly 
earlier ones, e.g. one that occurred in 1990, did not feature within media reporting. 
This is particularly so for victims who do not possess the ideal characteristics that 
would make a story particularly newsworthy. For example, we could find no media 
coverage in the case of a terminally ill eighty-year old woman whose death was 
caused by the momentary error of a surgeon. Although the death of a baby after a 
surgical procedure garnered huge press attention despite no fault being found. It is 
likely, precisely because of the developing culture of distrust in professionals, referred 
to earlier, that such cases, which would not have merited media attention decades ago, 
are now deemed to be of general interest. Moreover, Ferner and McDowell provide no 
other support for their claims of increased prosecutions since 1995: their statement 
that ‘… the 1990s saw a marked increase in the number of doctors charged with 
manslaughter’ has two footnotes in support. But both sources are short ‘news’ pieces 
in the BMJ that base assertions of increased prosecutions on an earlier article by 
Ferner in the BMJ. Ferner and McDowell’s article simply widens the search used in 
                                                           
72
 S. O’Doherty, ‘Doctors charged with manslaughter in the course of medical practice 1795-2005: A 
response’, unpublished, p. 3. 
73
 D. Griffiths and A. Alghrani, ‘“Criminal” Healthcare Professionals: Medical Malpractices and Public 
Perceptions’, unpublished. See also M. Brazier, ‘Times of Change?’ (2005) 13 Medical Law Review, 1, 
1-16. 
Bioethics, medicine and the criminal law: v2: Medicine, Crime and Society. Sanders, A. & 
Griffiths, D. (eds.). Cambridge University Press,p. 117-158 
Ferner’s earlier research, using the same methodology.74 Ferner and McDowell are 
therefore on their own in their claims of increased prosecutions since 1995, which are, 
we have seen, based on a methodology that we know is unreliable. 
 
b) Increase in prosecutions but no lowering of threshold 
 
There is little doubt that there has been an increase in the number of coronial inquests 
and police investigations in these kinds of cases.75 Any increase in prosecutions that 
there might have been could be because more strong cases present themselves to the 
CPS than was so ten or more years ago. One reason for this could be that as the NHS 
and the number of complex near-death cases have expanded (advances in medicine 
prolonging the life of people who would have died only a few decades ago), there are 
more opportunities for fatal error than there used to be. Also, the culture of distrust 
and the increased willingness to listen to victims, that Quick and other commentators 
use to justify the belief that prosecutors prosecute more readily, along with Article 2 
ECHR, can be seen to have a different effect: these have probably driven the police 
and coroners to investigate more cases (as is evident from the cases discussed in 
section 4 (iii) and (iv) below). This could have produced more prosecutable cases for 
the CPS to deal with than hitherto i.e. cases that would not have come to light as 
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potentially prosecutable many years ago. If criminal investigations are increasing, and 
are largely driven by families and coroners’ concerns, this alerts us to the probability 
that redress and accountability is increasingly being sought through the criminal 
process. 
 
c) Convincing the jury 
 
The evidence that we will present below indicates that the CPS seems to have 
difficulty in prosecuting MM cases in general, and that it does its best to ensure that a 
case is robust. We shall see that, rather than being keen – and more keen than in the 
past – to prosecute, the CPS is actually reluctant to prosecute. This is often borne out 
of the awareness that judges and juries do not like having these cases, particularly 
doctors, in front of them and to quote one prosecuting lawyer, ‘we often have to go 
that extra hurdle to ensure that the case is not going to fall at half time’. While the low 
conviction rate in medical manslaughter cases76 could indicate a low evidential 
threshold, the more likely explanation is that trials for medical manslaughter are 
particularly precarious. Our analysis and interviews have shown that at trial, a case 
can very easily fall after for example, a new defence hypothesis as to the cause of 
death, fresh unforeseen evidence and witnesses (who are notoriously unreliable in 
medical cases) failing to perform well. For example, in one prosecution that we 
looked at, despite the evidence being perceived as strong pre-trial, the doctor was 
acquitted. The prosecuting lawyer on the case stated that the major reason for the not-
guilty verdict was the fact that the main prosecution witness did not come up to proof 
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in the witness box, despite being strong in her previous statements and the 
prosecution’s main expert witness faltered in their evidence in court.  
A police doctor was recently put on trial for medical manslaughter after a man 
held in custody died. The man was a heavy drinker, had epilepsy and schizophrenia 
and had banged his head and become unconscious during his arrest; the doctor 
examined him for less than a minute in his cell, failed to try to rouse him and did not 
take any kind of medical history. Despite such obvious failures in care, the jury found 
him not guilty arguably related to the reluctance of juries to convict.77  
As O’Doherty states: 
 
Patients see doctors because they are ill, possibly from multiple 
disorders…. When faced with a defence hypothesis as to the cause of 
death, prosecution experts may, quite properly, concede that such a 
hypothesis cannot be excluded and because of the heavy burden of 
proof on the Crown, the prosecution may offer no further evidence. 
Fresh evidence may arise during trial which cannot be foreseen and 
witnesses may fail to come up to proof but that does not mean that 
the CPS decision process had failed78. 
 
Only about five percent of MM cases investigated proceed to a prosecution, this is, by 
any standards, a low figure. It appears that, rather than too many cases being 
prosecuted, there could be too few cases prosecuted. We now go on to assess this 
possibility and look at why this might be. 
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4. Prosecution decision making in England and Wales in relation to health care 
deaths 
 
We looked at seventy-five CPS cases in total and have categorised the decisions 
within those files into five groups. 
 
a) No decision 
 
In seven percent (five cases) no decision was made by the CPS. All of these files were 
advice files, where the police had referred the brief circumstances of a case early on in 
order to ascertain whether a full investigation was required and the case had 
subsequently been closed without gathering such evidence. In all of these cases the 
CPS prosecutor had suggested what further evidence could be collected, and gave 
advice on how to collect that evidence. The police exercised their own discretion in 
deciding to close these cases.  
Whilst we cannot make firm generalisations on the basis of just five cases, we 
can make tentative links between these cases and the uneven application of police 
discretion and case construction by prosecutors79. For example, the victims in two of 
these cases were drug and alcohol users, and in the other three they were elderly 
patients. There appeared to be no family involvement in these cases. In other words, 
there was no pressure to conduct full investigations, and police (and perhaps CPS) 
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evaluations could have been that the cases concerned the opposite of ‘ideal victims’80 
and therefore embodied a relatively small public interest in prosecuting. For example, 
in one case involving an elderly patient, despite there being clear evidence that the 
death could have been avoided but for the actions of the doctors involved, the police 
closed the case as ‘it was likely to take up more resources than we could bring to bear 
on it’. In a case involving a young man, who was a drug user, the file made repeated 
mention to the fact that this was an ‘unhappy, difficult and troubled young man’. The 
man was wrongly prescribed drugs in a quantity that was too much for someone who 
had previously attempted suicide several times. The police had gathered very little 
material which was submitted to the CPS, who advised on the basis of such little 
evidence ‘that it looks like there would be no case’ and the police did not continue 
with the investigation. 
 
b) Prosecution – all tests met 
 
In five percent (four cases) the CPS decided that the evidential and public interest 
tests were met and therefore prosecuted. Of these cases there were two convictions 
and one acquittal. One case never got to trial as defendant fled the UK and could not 
be extradited.  
In one case that was prosecuted there was strong evidence in the file that the 
doctor was warned by colleagues not to proceed with a procedure. In another 
prosecution, the doctor was warned by the patient that she was allergic to a certain 
drug. Despite such warnings the doctors went ahead. Another doctor who faced 
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prosecution killed his patient by giving an overdose of a routinely used painkiller. Her 
behaviour was deemed grossly negligent (indeed reckless) due to the facts, among 
other things, that a) prior to seeing the victim, she had given an overdose to another 
patient (who survived); b) the victim was given the diamorphine for a simple ailment; 
c) she had given the thirty mg dose in one go as opposed to the normal procedure of 
administering a dose at one mg per minute; and d) she failed to stay with his patient 
for the minimum of thirty to forty minutes as is normal when morphine has been 
administered by a GP. Finally a doctor was deemed to have used grossly excessive 
force in using forceps to deliver a baby, and continued to use such force despite the 
fact that the patient, her family and other nursing staff warned against proceeding with 
a forceps delivery. The prosecution did not proceed as he fled the UK and could not 
be subsequently extradited. 
In all of these cases, establishing a breach of duty and causation seemed from 
the prosecution files to be relatively unproblematic and agreed on by the experts who 
were consulted. In assessing the grossness of the breach, in all cases there appeared to 
be subjective recklessness. In none of these cases did moral culpability appear to be 
low. Additionally the language used in some of the files denoted that the health care 
professional involved displayed an element of additional ‘bad’ character. For 
example, a prosecutor described how one doctor displayed great arrogance and little 
remorse. In another case, the file described in detail the personal problems that the 
doctor was experiencing at the time she made her fatal mistake. Many prosecutors 
told us that such elements of ‘badness’ were often crucial in securing a guilty verdict. 
To quote one lawyer, ‘you need something more than a serious error of judgement; 
you need something ‘dirty’ something the jury can latch on to’. 
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At trial, the picture changed to varying extents in these cases, as it always does 
after the defence gives evidence, particularly surrounding issues of causation. 
 
c) No breach of the duty of care 
 
In twenty (twenty-seven percent) of the cases, no breach of duty of care was found in 
relation to the individuals being investigated. 
 
i) In around half of these cases it was clear that there would be difficulty identifying a 
breach from the beginning. For example, a nine-week old baby bled to death after a 
routine circumcision. The post-mortem was inconclusive as to why the bleed occurred 
and there was no evidence that the operation was performed negligently. Despite the 
early finding that causation could not be proved, a full one and a half year police 
investigation was initiated, after which it was concluded that there were no grounds to 
argue that the GP who performed the operation had breached his duty of care. Like 
the other cases in this category it proceeded to a full police investigation and SCD 
review despite it being obvious from a very early stage that the evidential threshold 
would not be reached. This raises the question why these cases did not fall into 
category (a) above i.e. an initial investigation that was not pursued in depth because of 
lack of evidence of an essential element of the crime. There are three possibilities, 
which may arise singly or in combination, in any one case: 
 
- because of ‘right to life’ obligations and associated coronial investigations (see 
section 1) many cases are investigated more thoroughly than would appear 
necessary; 
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- it is not necessary to exhaustively investigate if the police and CPS are sure 
that there is no crime or that the culprit cannot be apprehended or that they 
cannot secure sufficient evidence. But this requires early communication of 
the case by the police to SCD. Many police officers, in some of these cases, it 
appears, and in general, are unaware of this possibility; 
- some cases seem to have been pursued at length because of family pressure on 
the police and/or media interest.. One such case was the example above. The 
case garnered immense press attention and the tragic nature of the death was 
reiterated through the file. Another case had been ongoing for over seven 
years and had been pursued by a relation of the deceased who had used his 
own money in order to seek a judicial review, despite the fact that from the 
beginning there was little evidence that the doctor had even breached his duty 
of care. In our interviews, several prosecutors noted to us that the police can 
often be over influenced by family pressure and pursue an investigation in 
more detail than they would otherwise. One prosecutor noted that this will 
often serve to ‘give the family false hope that there will be a trial and also 
raise suspicion that there must have been some wrongdoing’. The cases in 
category (a), by contrast, appear to have been subject to no family pressure or 
media interest. 
 
ii) In a third of the cases where no breach of duty was established, there was clear 
evidence of individual error. Three cases involved individual faults that contributed to 
a death yet no one individual could be identified as the cause of the particular 
error/incident. For example one case involved a toddler who died after a naso gastric 
tube was inserted into his lung and feed was introduced. Three nurses were involved 
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in his care but not one admitted making the mistake. One of them was almost 
certainly to blame but it was impossible to identify which one. 
 
iii) The rest of the cases involved errors or adverse incidents that could be directly 
related to systemic faults. For example, a man was refused treatment on arrival at an 
A and E department: the hospital staff had deemed that he posed a threat to staff 
because they believed he was using drugs and had shown slight aggression. He was 
taken to a police station where he suffered a cardiac arrest and died. The police 
investigation concluded that he did not have capacity on arrival at the hospital (he was 
suffering from ‘excited delirium’ in relation to his drug use) and should have been 
sedated and treated on the basis of his severe symptoms. Three individuals were 
investigated but Trust policies on ‘violent and aggressive behaviour’ had never been 
communicated to the individuals or tested, so no individual breaches of duty were 
found. 
  
d) Failure to establish causation 
 
Thirty-three (forty-four percent) of the cases failed on causation. We stated in section 
2 that causation is particularly problematic in MM cases. This is because, by 
definition, they involve cases where the victims are already ill or injured and so at 
greater risk of death than ‘normal’ people. Even when someone has a non-life-
threatening condition, the administration of an anaesthetic81 or drug to which they 
have an undisclosed allergy, or their exposure to hospital ‘superbugs’, can lead to 
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unexpected death without any negligence at all, let alone gross negligence. Vulnerable 
patients, particularly the elderly and the terminally ill, are (by definition) more 
vulnerable. Not only are they more susceptible to ‘things that go wrong’ (such as 
operations, allergies and exposure to superbugs), but they usually present to hospital 
with a series of existing ailments. In one case the pathologist concluded ‘establishing 
causation in the case of an eighty-five year old woman with a history of heart disease 
is near impossible even if gross negligence was present’. This was despite the fact that 
the woman had died following extreme failures in the level of nursing care. We 
identified different types of case where causation was impossible to prove: 
 
i) Only four of these cases could be said to involve no evidence of a fault or error. 
Like the cases in category (c) (i), these cases did, again, appear to be pushed forward 
more than appeared necessary by family pressure etc., even taking into account the 
need for Article 2 ECHR compliance. For example, a baby born at twenty-five weeks 
died due to natural causes. A doctor treating the baby had made a minor error which 
was found to be unrelated to the cause of death yet the police still pursed a lengthy 
investigation after the family had raised concerns. In a similar case where a baby died 
of meningitis, despite it being evident early on that causation would be very difficult 
to prove as the baby’s condition when he first presented in hospital was quite 
advanced, the police investigation was pursued in full over a two-year period.  
 
ii) The breach of duty in five of the cases (in our opinion) could have reached the 
threshold for gross negligence if causation could have been established. In two cases 
there was evidence of extreme negligence, and there were no mitigating factors that 
would have made appraisal of ‘all the circumstances’ lead to the conclusion that the 
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defendant’s behaviour was insufficiently ‘bad’ for the criminal standard to be 
reached: 
 
-  a baby died five days after birth due to serious omissions by one midwife in 
the management of pre-labour and labour, including lack of treatment of 
worsening symptoms in the mother over a two day period. Establishing 
causation was extremely complex and ultimately failed due to the experts’ 
reluctance in concluding beyond reasonable doubt that but for the midwife’s 
numerous acts and omissions, the baby would have survived; 
- a doctor accidentally administered four time the dosage of dopamine to an 
elderly patient, the effects of which ‘contributed to the death’ but could not be 
confidently said to have been a significant cause in this terminally ill patient. 
 
In 3 cases there was evidence of subjective recklessness. For example: 
 
- a surgeon proceeded with a non-essential operation despite knowing that the 
patient was at serious pre-operative risk and then failed to adequately treat her 
when she suffered a cardiac arrest during the surgery; 
- a nurse failed to treat an elderly woman who had suffered a non life 
threatening injury to her left foot and who progressively deteriorated due to 
the lack of care, despite the nurse being warned of the deterioration. Existing 
medical conditions meant that the cause of death was not established.  
 
iii) In the some of the cases, the level of a breach of duty of care would probably not 
have reached the threshold for grossness yet arguably the behaviour at stake went 
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beyond the civil level of negligence. For example, a diabetic man was admitted to 
hospital suffering from a urinary tract infection and septicaemia. He was given 
antibiotics and was described as sleepy and confused. Despite this, a nurse allowed 
him to self-administer insulin and he subsequently went on to take three times the 
usual dose and was found unconscious. He died three days later from pneumonia and 
while the experts concluded that the insulin overdose was a significant contributory 
factor, two of the experts would not commit to being sure that, but for the overdose, 
the patient (who was elderly) would not have contracted pneumonia and died.  
 
iv) Other cases involved serious systemic failures. For example, a registered nurse 
provided home night care to a terminally ill baby. The nurse was employed by an 
independent nursing agency which had not checked on her background or 
qualifications. Whilst the nurse’s actions were clearly negligent, she had asked the 
agency why she was being sent to the patient’s house on that night when she was 
inexperienced in paediatric care but felt she would lose her job if she refused. Thus ‘in 
the circumstances’ of her inadequate qualifications and training it could justifiably be 
said that her negligence was not ‘gross’. Systemic failures such as occurred in this 
case should prompt consideration of prosecution for corporate manslaughter. But 
there is the same need to prove causation as in ‘normal’ MM. In any event, the 
particularities of the common law offence (which was applicable at the time of this 
case) and the new corporate manslaughter law, make corporate prosecutions in 
medical cases almost impossible except in the most extreme cases.82 
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e) Failure to reach ‘gross’ threshold 
 
Thirteen (seventeen percent) of the cases fell into this category. 
 
i) A quarter of the cases included evidence of subjective recklessness yet there were 
‘circumstances’ (that could be characterised as ‘mitigating’) or other reasons why 
they were judged not to meet the ‘gross’ threshold. For example, a surgeon perforated 
a major organ during an operation to take a biopsy and the patient subsequently died. 
Nurses attending the operation stated that they expressed worries to the surgeon about 
the procedure. Subsequent investigations showed that the particularly difficult nature 
of the operation meant that the perforation that caused death was understandable. The 
surgeon knowingly took a risk that may or may not have been justified, but it was not 
a grossly negligent decision ‘in the circumstances’. Other cases involved failures in 
care by a number of individuals yet none of which individually reached the threshold 
for gross negligence. To quote a common theme within many of these files, despite a 
case being caused by minor and reckless failures by a number of individuals, of these 
failures could not be summed in order to reach the threshold required. 
 
ii) In about half of the cases there was clear evidence of gross negligence on our 
interpretation. In all of these cases, the CPS took into account circumstances that 
could be characterised as ‘mitigating’, which were said to have affected the healthcare 
professional’s behaviour e.g. pressure, stress, end of long shift. For example, in one 
case a doctor accidentally inserted a chest drain into the patient’s heart causing a 
catastrophic and fatal haemorrhage, and in another a nurse mixed up two bags and 
accidentally and fatally administered a pain relief infusion intended for epidural use 
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into a patient’s arm ( he was pronounced dead 1 hour later). Both healthcare 
professionals were said to have worked very long shifts without adequate breaks due 
to understaffing and had previously displayed exemplary character and work. Another 
example included a nurse who incorrectly placed a naso gastric tube into a patient’s 
lung, yet this failure was found to be a result of poor practice that had developed on 
the ward and was condoned by clinicians and more senior management. The nurse 
was described as a hard working and dedicated professional who had never displayed 
any previous bad character. 
 
iii) Finally in around a quarter of cases in this category, the incidents and errors that 
occurred lacked any evidence of mitigating circumstances or systemic issues. In most 
of these cases it was clear that the CPS were reluctant to prosecute because there was 
little evidence of subjective recklessness. In many of the cases, incompetence rather 
than deliberate wrongdoing was blamed. Examples include a GP who, over a period 
of two months failed to diagnose an infection in a young child. Despite the child’s 
dramatically worsening symptoms, the GP failed to chase urine tests or make an 
urgent referral. The prosecutor concluded that the failings of this doctor demonstrated 
a ‘clear need for assessment and further training within the field of paediatrics’. It was 
noted that this was a ‘tragic mistake by a dedicated professional’. Two nurses had 
caused the death of a diabetic patient due to incorrect treatment for hyperglycaemia. 
The errors were put down to a lack of experience and failure to check the original 
prescription rather than a ‘wicked and abysmal act’. The rest of the cases involved a 
momentary error on the part of an otherwise competent practitioner A doctor fatally 
administered an excess of a particular solution during an operation. The file 
concluded that ‘this was a tragic mistake by a dedicated professional with fatal 
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consequences’. A doctor had accidently given a fatal overdose of drug to a patient but 
the review note concluded that the doctor had clearly ‘made a mistake which he has 
now recognised but the breach of duty was a serious error of judgement rather than a 
gross and therefore criminal act’. The note makes reference to how remorseful the 
doctor has been, how his motivation had been clearly to act in the best interests of his 
patient and how the family are very sympathetic towards the doctor and are aware he 
had done his best to care for their relative. In another case a doctor had wrongly 
prescribed a drug which led to the death of her patient. The review note concluded 
that ‘this appears to be a tragic error of misjudgement by the professional involved’ 
not a criminal breach of duty and her previous good conduct, and the fact that she had 
previously on that day issued the right dosages of the same drug, went in her favour.  
 
It is hard to escape the conclusion that in many or most of these cases the public 
interest test was being applied under the guise of the evidential test; and/or that in 
cases such as these the two tests merge. The tests could merge because juries would 
be expected to have the same feelings of sympathy towards the health care 
professionals in question that the prosecutors expressed (e.g. ‘tragic mistake by a 
dedicated professional’). Acquittals would therefore have been likely even if all the 
elements of Adomako were satisfied.83 It will also be evident that many of these cases 
included systemic aspects, Many of these files very briefly considered a charge of 
corporate manslaughter but as all of the cases we looked at occurred before the 
creation of the 2007 Act, the difficulty of identifying a ‘controlling mind’ that was 
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reckless or negligent meant that such a charge was ruled out very early on. It is 
unlikely that the new Act would have made a difference in these cases. Again, 
prosecutors and juries can be expected to have more sympathy with health care 
professionals who have been let down by their organisation, or put in an invidious 
position by it, than with people who put themselves in these positions through greed 
or wilful carelessness. 
The prosecutors in these cases would argue that they are simply applying the 
evidential test: that it was more likely than not that gross negligence could not be 
proved and/or that the ‘5th element’ (‘badness’) could not be proved when ‘all the 
circumstances’ are taken into account. Such circumstances include long shifts causing 
tiredness a momentary slip or error, and lack of experience. But the stress by 
prosecutors in many of these cases on incompetence rather than deliberate wrong-
doing seems irrelevant when prosecutors need not prove subjective recklessness; and 
the stress on ‘exemplary’ character and past record seems irrelevant when ‘badness’ 
needs to be found in the act, not the person. In other words, prosecutors seem to be 
searching for something beyond what we might term ‘threshold gross negligence’ in 
order to prosecute. This might be for the following reasons, alone or in combination: 
 
- they perceive a legal obligation produced by the ‘5th element’ to prosecute 
only when there is evidence of culpability substantially above that threshold; 
-  they think there is no reasonable prospect of conviction by a jury, despite 
what might be enough evidence in theory, where culpability is not 
substantially above that threshold; 
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- they have no wish to prosecute in cases where culpability is not substantially 
above that threshold, and so apply the ‘public interest’ test under the guise of 
the evidential test. 
 
This can all occur because of the vagueness and circularity of then ‘gross negligence’ 
test. The ‘5th element’ is only one aspect of this, but it seems to be a particularly 
important one in the light of phrases such as ‘wicked and abysmal act’ that are used in 
the search for ‘badness’. 
 
5. Alternatives to medical manslaughter by gross negligence 
 
To summarise so far, we have seen that interest in the use of criminal sanctions for 
medical error was sparked by the claims that a) prosecutions are increasing; b) this is 
because the CPS has been lowering the threshold for prosecution in response to public 
pressure; and c) altering the threshold is facilitated by the uncertain tests for GNM 
created by Adomako and subsequent cases. The empirical research carried out to test 
these claims found that whilst (c) is undoubtedly true, the vagueness of the tests 
allows the threshold to be raised as well as lowered. Far from finding excessive 
numbers of prosecutions, we found remarkably few. While we cannot definitely 
conclude from our relatively unsystematic sample of cases that prosecutions have not 
risen, we found no evidence that they have done so. It is true that there is increasing 
public pressure, particularly from victims’ families, to invoke the criminal process, 
and this does seem to have led to more police investigations and protracted inquests. 
But rather than prosecutors lowering the threshold in response to pressure, we found 
that thresholds were sometimes higher than they needed to be. However, the main 
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reason for the lower-than-expected number of prosecutions was not the generous 
exercise of discretion by prosecutors, but the nature of the GNM tests and the 
particular circumstances in which MM occurs. These circumstances are, primarily: 
 
i) The dead people are generally at risk of death even before they get into 
the hands of the accused, thus often making causation impossible to 
prove. 
ii)  As with corporate killings, many medical deaths occur as a result of a 
chain of relatively small mistakes. At any point in that chain of events 
a good decision would have averted catastrophe. Thus the contribution 
of each individual is often either impossible to determine or so small 
that it cannot said to be a substantial cause of death. 
 
These conclusions lead us, perhaps surprisingly, to consider not how GNM should be 
reduced in scope in cases of medical error, but how it might be increased. The 
purpose would be both to acknowledge the legitimacy, at least in some respects, of 





Quick argues that reckless manslaughter – based on a largely subjective test – would 
be a good substitute for GNM in general. He argues that this would set the level of 
liability at an appropriate level, and would offer greater certainty for prosecutors, 
judges and juries who currently struggle with the vague and imprecise notion of gross 
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negligence. Raising the bar of liability from gross negligence to recklessness would 
also, he argues, reduce the number of prosecutions against healthcare professionals. 
Whether, in the light of our argument that prosecutions are currently neither 
increasing nor inappropriate, Quick would change his view, remains to be seen. As it 
is, his view is that a positive feature of reckless would be that: 
 
where a doctor has special knowledge that certain procedures carry 
with them certain risks, and fails to investigate those risks without 
justification, criminal responsibility can be properly attributed on 
the basis of recklessness84 
 
However, a defendant’s subjective awareness at the time of an incident is not easily 
proved. The fact that health care professionals have special knowledge and should be 
aware of the risks of death in a particular situation does not mean that proof that they 
were aware could be proven without objective evidence (e.g. ignoring warnings). 
Without objective evidence, evidence of gross negligence will be used, as it is in other 
cases, as evidence that the defendant must have realised what is being alleged. Thus 
Quick cites a prosecutor who says ‘I can’t see how we would bring a prosecution 
without an element of subjective recklessness … even if there’s no direct evidence of 
subjective recklessness … but it may be so blindingly obvious that anyone must have 
realised …’.85 But what may be ‘obvious’ to a prosecutor working on the basis on a 
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paper file will often not be obvious to a jury following oral evidence and hearing the 
defendant. So instead of the jury guessing what is meant by ‘gross negligence’ and 
whether this accurately describes the defendant’s behaviour, with a subjective 
recklessness test the jury will have to guess whether what was obvious with hindsight 
was actually perceived by the defendant. 
Creating a recklessness test would eliminate those cases where moral 
culpability is low such as in Sullman and Prentice and the case of Dr Falconer.86 
However, only around six percent of cases in our analysis raised such familiar 
questions surrounding criminal liability for negligence and could be said to be the 
typical momentary slip (for example, the doctor who through a momentary error 
fatally administered the wrong drug to a baby and the doctor who accidentally pierced 
a patient’s heart when inserting a chest drain). It was clear from the case files that we 
accessed, the CPS were reluctant to prosecute medical cases where moral culpability 
is questionable – ‘dubious cases on the cusp’87 – particularly where there were 
mitigating circumstances and where the incident was a momentary lapse on the part of 
an otherwise exemplary doctor or nurse. None of these cases proceeded, in contrast to 
those cases where there was evidence of recklessness (without mitigating 
circumstances). Whilst the law surrounding gross negligence may be unclear, the CPS 
decision making that we analysed in this area was certainly consistent. 
The case for a recklessness test rests in part on the arguments of principle 
against GNM by gross negligence discussed in section 2. The first of these was moral 
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luck: why punish harm caused inadvertently and only when, by a chance of fate, it 
causes death? The first part of this argument applies to all ‘result’ crimes (such as 
‘causing’ GBH) and the second part applies to all forms of involuntary manslaughter 
(the clue is in the term ‘involuntary’). And indeed many murders.88 Second, it is 
sometimes thought wrong to criminalise behaviour done grossly badly but with good 
motives. But this argument would apply to many other areas of life, such as the 
employer whose poor safety standards cause death. In Holtom,89 for example (to 
simply take the most recent case to come up on a Westlaw search) a fifteen-year old 
boy died when a wall fell on him. He had been demolishing the wall for his employer, 
the defendant, without training, safety equipment or supervision. The defendant had 
been told the wall was leaning. Perhaps he was subjectively reckless, though it is not 
clear that this could have been proved. But he was clearly grossly negligent. Related 
to this argument is the view that the coercive punishment unique to criminal law 
requires that subjective risk-taking or intent to do harm be proven. But if this were so, 
a huge range of lesser offences would be de-criminalised (e.g. road traffic offences, 
health and safety etc.). Moreover, in recent years the case for subjectivism in more 
serious offences has been challenged by the problems of securing convictions in 
sexual offences. Thus proof of rape no longer requires subjective awareness that the 
victim was not consenting. Specific problems are sometimes seen as justifying 
specific solutions. Sexual crime is one such, and so is gross medical malpractice. 
Changing the bar of liability to subjective recklessness would have little 
impact on the decisions made in the cases we had access to. Of course, the cases we 
looked at covered a relatively short period and there is certainly case law to show that 
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CPS prosecutors have not always displayed such reluctance, as cases such as Sullman 
and Prentice and in the case of Dr Falconer 90 demonstrate. But cases like these are 
rare, and appear to be in the past (prior to Rowley and Misra, discussed in section 2). 
There is no need to change the bar in order to prevent prosecution of momentary error 
because prosecutors have in effect done this already by adopting the ‘5th test’ in the 
last few years. We should, in any event, resist making changes that will have 
widespread effects because of a few difficult cases. Nearly all of the prosecutors and 
defence lawyers we interviewed stated that the test for objective liability was essential 
in order to capture those cases which, however rare, were criminally culpable.  
Whether or not a recklessness-based form of MM would provide more 
certainty than GNM does, it would not cover cases in category 4 (iv) above: where 
causation could not be proven. And, insofar as much uncertainty would remain (in 
cases where evidence of gross negligence was relied on as evidence of recklessness), 
this uncertainty could still be used to ‘smuggle’ in ‘public interest’ considerations 
under the guise of the ‘evidential’ test. Finally, it would not cover professionals who 
were hugely reckless but whose acts or omissions did not cause death (see later). 
 
A context-specific revised version of GNM 
 
Ashworth suggests that negligence tests may be appropriate where the harm is great, 
the risk of it occurring is obvious, and where the defendant has both the duty and 
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capacity to avoid the risk.91 The applicability of these criteria to MM (although they 
were not formulated specifically for it) is clear. 
Brazier and Alghrani argue, in the light of critiques such as that of Quick, that 
the challenge then becomes to propose a more substantive test for MM. They go on to 
offer an expansion of the four-part Adomako test: 
 
(1) Did the alleged negligence fall short of responsible professional practice so 
as to engage liability in tort? 
(2) Did the doctor show indifference to an obvious risk of serious injury to his 
patient? If the answer is yes, his negligence is gross, as he has failed altogether 
in his duty to his patient, and in his lack of regard for others' welfare his 
conduct equates to deliberate wrongdoing, irrespective of external 
circumstances or his own capacities. 
(3) Was the doctor aware of such a risk and nonetheless exposed the patient to 
that risk for no accepted medical benefit? If the answer is yes, his negligence 
is gross unless there is overwhelming evidence of significant mitigating 
factors, for example that the doctor was working in circumstances that 
substantially impaired his ability to provide adequate care for his patient. 
(4) Should the doctor have been aware of such a risk and, if he was not, did his 
practice fall significantly below the standard required by responsible 
professional opinion? If the answer is yes, his negligence is gross unless there 
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is evidence of significant mitigating factors, for example that the doctor lacked 
the experience or capacity to deliver the treatment in question.92 
 
This would, to some extent, meet Quick’s concerns about the threshold for MM and 
the lack of certainty in the ‘gross negligence’ test, but it only goes so far along the 
path he advocates. If, as he suggests, prosecutorial policy became more clear and 
explicit about the mitigating circumstances which are taken into account when 
considering (objective) medical errors, his concerns would be further allayed.93 
Leaving prosecutorial policy to the discretion of the individual prosecutor can result 
in unfairness and uncertainty for the health care professional and victim/relatives. 
Even if there is no prosecution, as is usual, the period of waiting during a lengthy 
investigation must be gruelling. This was recognised in relation to assisted suicide, 
and detailed guidance for prosecutors has been published. This sets out the factors 
taken into account in deciding whether or not to prosecute.94 So although the CPS still 
has to consider, in each assisted suicide case, whether or not to prosecute, victims, 
suspects, prosecutors and the public all know the basis on which decisions will be 
made and can now make reasonable predictions what they will be. The same could be 
done in relation to MM. 
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However, from our point of view the problem of causation would remain in 
Brazier and Algrhani’s revised version of MM, and if a prosecution policy is 
formulated and published, and even if both were done. In other words, these would be 
welcome reforms but they are not the only desirable ones. 
 
A context-specific offence of ‘medical neglect endangering life’ 
 
A context specific negligence based offence for health care could offer a fairer and 
more nuanced approach to using criminal law in this area. Road, work and familial 
homicide now warrant separate offences.95 Yet, Quick argues, creating such a context 
specific criminal offence for dealing with fatal medical error would depend on a well 
understood typology of error, and its relationship with individual blame.96 Medical 
errors are more variable and complex than those associated with driving or domestic 
violence and while there are useful classifications of medical errors,97 Quick notes 
that the systematic study of error is at this time insufficiently well developed and has 
certainly not filtered down to prosecutors. This uncertainty surrounding a taxonomy 
of medical errors would, for Quick, also apply to the creation of offences of carelessly 
causing serious harm, or endangering life, in health care. However, it is not clear why 
this would be more of a concern in the health care context than in relation to health 
and safety at work or in relation to child neglect, to take just two examples. 
There are several reasons why we should consider such an offence. Firstly, we 
have identified cases where there was clear evidence of recklessness but which fell on 
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establishing causation. For example, the surgeon who proceeded with a non-essential 
operation (nose reshaping) despite knowing that the patient was at serious pre-
operative risk: the severe harm that was inflicted was not in doubt, whether or not it 
could be proved beyond reasonable doubt to have caused the death. Serious omissions 
by a midwife in the management of pre-labour and labour, despite being given 
warnings, also caused serious harm according to the expert evidence in the case. And 
then there was the nurse who, despite warnings, deliberately failed to treat an elderly 
patient who had suffered a non life-threatening injury to her left foot. Secondly there 
were those cases where there was evidence of neglect that fell on causation and failed 
to meet the threshold for criminal negligence. For example, the elderly diabetic man 
described as ‘confused and drowsy’ who was allowed to self-administer insulin and 
subsequently went on to take three times the usual dose. Thirdly there are those 
fatalities that have resulted from a number of individual errors/failures/incompetence 
but no one individual error can be said to have caused the death or reach the gross 
threshold. There is still evidence of culpability here, just not high enough for medical 
manslaughter. Finally there are those errors stemming from systemic wrongdoing 
(e.g. failing to ensure a nurse has the necessary qualifications and training, and failing 
to ensure that there are proper procedures in place for the insertion of a naso-gastric 
tube) but which would fall on causation in any charge of corporate manslaughter, or 
fail due to the numerous difficulties with this offence generally. If we agree that the 
above range of conduct constitutes ‘substantial wrongdoing’ then this surely stands 
regardless of whether or not it could be established to have caused death or whether it 
meets the threshold for gross negligence or corporate manslaughter. Here then there is 
a case for using alternative criminal offences that do not rest on ‘grossness’ or 
causation. 
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Perhaps most important, what about the cases that nearly end up as homicide, 
but do not through sheer chance? Quick, along with other commentators, bases much 
of his argument against GNM on this point: that in most GNM cases it is purely a 
matter of ‘moral luck’ whether someone dies and thus whether there is the chance of 
criminal liability.98 But if it is illogical to distinguish between those who survive by 
chance and those who do not, this would apply equally if we replaced GNM with his 
preferred ‘manslaughter by recklessness’ offence. 
And the argument works the other way. If it is unfair that the only people who 
are prosecuted in GNM cases are those who are unlucky enough to cause death, 
fairness would be restored if people who are grossly negligent are prosecuted on the 
basis of their behaviour and the risk to life that it creates, regardless of whether they 
cause death. 
Take the case of Jamie Merrett, a thirty-seven year old tetraplegic patient who 
relied on a ventilator to breathe. The ventilator was switched off deliberately by his 
nurse who, it appears, did not realise that the consequences could be damaging or fatal 
(she was a learning disabilities specialist, and was not trained to manage a ventilated 
patient). When the mistake was pointed out by a colleague the nurse attempted to 
resuscitate Merrett, but she carried out the procedure incorrectly. Paramedics 
managed to do it only twenty-one minutes after the ventilator was switched of, 
leaving Merrett with severe brain damage. Under current criminal law, neither the 
nurse, nor the agency employing her who did not ensure she had been trained 
appropriately, nor the NHS Trust, will be criminally liable. For at least one of these 
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parties that would not be so had Merrett died. Yet his suffering was indescribable.99 
Another example is the acquittal of a consultant urologist and a locum registrar, who 
were charged with manslaughter because a patient died after they removed a patient's 
healthy kidney by mistake instead of the diseased one.100 They were acquitted because 
causation could not be proven, but they surely committed an error worthy of 
punishment. And Lisa Sharpe spent days in agony without pain relief because a doctor 
believed that she would die in two hours and, it seems, no-one cared sufficiently to 
check despite her mother’s protests: ‘They left her fighting for breath and in terrible 
pain. It was like watching someone drown before your eyes.’ This was condemned by 
the health ombudsman but the neglect could not be shown to have caused Lisa’s 
death.101 
As Quick himself acknowledges, ‘the absence of a lesser or inchoate crime 
renders this [GNM] an unsatisfactory “all or nothing” scenario.’102 Our proposal is 
therefore that an offence be created of ‘medical neglect endangering life’. This would 
have the following elements, all of which would need to be proven: 
 
a) An act or omission (or, in the case of a hospital or trust, a systemic error) 
that endangered life (an objective test); 
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b) Committed by a health care professional in the course of his/her work; 
c) The act or omission or systemic error would have to be grossly negligent 
or reckless. 
 
Similar crimes in relation to mentally ill and learning disabled patients are set out in 
the Mental Health Act 1983 and Mental Capacity Act 2005 respectively. Allen argues 
for these to be broadened in order to cover anyone owing a duty to someone else. This 
may be a good idea, and if such a broad law is enacted, our proposal will not be 
needed.103 Meanwhile, however, there can be no argument that our context-specific 
crime would be inappropriate unless the same is said of the crimes in the Mental 
Health and Mental Capacity Acts. There is a legitimate concern about the 
proliferation of context-specific crimes and over-criminalisation in general.104 So we 
need principles of criminalisation to ensure that each new offence created, especially 
context-specific ones, have special justification. Generally the justification is that such 
crimes are created in relation to especially powerful groups from whom specially 
vulnerable groups need protection. This is why children and the mentally ill, for 
example, are protected by context-specific criminal laws. But medical patients are in a 
similarly vulnerable position in relation to doctors and nurses. We also need clear 
published prosecution policies to ensure that only genuinely serious cases are 
prosecuted and that health care professionals need not fear prosecution where it would 
not be seriously contemplated. 
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The prosecution (or threat of prosecution) of a larger number of cases where 
there has been deliberate disregard or recklessness, as well as gross neglect, promises 
more of a deterrent effect than the prosecution of a few cases where chance as much 
as anything else makes a homicide prosecution possible. It is true that this deterrent 
effect may still be minimal as it probably is in relation to tort cases. There is also 
concern that use of the criminal law to punish medical negligence will increase 
‘defensive medicine’ and reduce whatever culture of openness in admitting mistakes 
and learning from these mistakes has developed in recent years105. However around 
two thirds of the cases we looked at arose through concerns raised by families and 
coroners, not through open admission of the healthcare professional or trust involved. 
In other words, the culture of openness is too limited at present to be worth preserving 
if the gains from alternative action are likely to be significant. Indeed, the number of 
deaths from incorrect administration of opiate medicines, for example, remains 
worryingly high despite well-publicised cases such as that of Dr Ubani. It is probably 
true that there could be better mechanisms of accountability than the criminal process, 
and that New Zealand, for example, has arguably introduced such mechanisms.106 It is 
also true that many MM cases, prosecuted and not prosecuted, reveal serious systemic 
errors and might be more effectively and more appropriately dealt with as corporate 
killings. This includes Adomako where the defendant should not have been allowed to 
work, Lisa Sharpe (whose case reveals systemic neglect of the learning disabled) and 
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the continued trail of vincristine deaths. But the prospects of the 2007 Act having 
teeth in practice, particularly in the medical context, are very small.107 Whilst the UK 
lacks effective mechanisms of accountability at either organisational or individual 
level, we are left largely with individual criminal liability. 
Despite the arguments in favour of retaining MM as it is now and creating a 
lesser included offence, the contrary arguments that we cite are substantial. However, 
these are arguments against punishment as much as they are against criminalisation. 
They focus on the need to learn from error and reduce bad behaviour, and rightly 
recognise that punitive processes are largely ineffective in these respects. However, as 
we flagged up in section 2, RJ provides an alternative approach – one that has the 
force of criminal law but the substance of civil and arbitral processes. There is no 
space to elaborate here,108 but if prosecution guidelines are to be issued in relation to 
when cases are to be prosecuted, they could also set out how they are to be processed. 
Moreover, if RJ were used instead of punitive processes in all or most cases, 
prosecutors would be more willing to take formal action, and – when cases were 
prosecuted – juries would be more likely to convict, as the ‘punishment’ would be 
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Everyone agrees that GNN is problematic. Academics find it illogical, ill-defined and 
a matter of luck, as liability is often a matter of good or bad fortune. Practitioners 
have the same objection, with the added concern about the effect of just an 
investigation on their personal and professional lives, let alone a prosecution. Police 
officers spend considerable time investigating cases for which they have little or no 
expertise and which usually go nowhere, and prosecutors spend considerable time 
reviewing them. The down-sides of GNM are potentially particularly unfortunate in 
the medical context as we want medical professionals to be open about mistakes in the 
interest of preventing future errors, and we do not want medical professionals to avoid 
taking appropriate risks for fear of investigation and/or prosecution i.e. for defensive 
medicine to increase. 
If Ferner and McDowell are correct that the CPS increasingly readily 
prosecutes MM, the damage would be great. However, we found no evidence for 
Ferner and McDowell’s assertions. But we did find, as readers of their research would 
expect, that there are a very large number of investigations into whether or not MM 
should be prosecuted. Whereas Ferner and McDowell ascribe this to vindictiveness on 
the part of the CPS (and presumably the police, though they do not say this) we found 
no evidence of institutional vindictiveness. The probable increase in investigations is 
almost certainly due to Article 2 ‘right to life’ obligations (whether real or perceived) 
and increased pressure from families and the media. The latter is probably due in part 
to increased knowledge of the legal possibilities on their part and increased 
willingness to challenge authority. It does seem that many of these investigations are 
pointless, at least in the depth to which they go and hence the time scale involved. 
Resources that would be better used elsewhere are used with no result, the shadow 
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cast over the lives of the professionals under investigation are unnecessarily 
protracted, and families are given false hope, with closure put off into a distant future. 
Ferner and McDowell’s concerns should not be ignored. But the concerns that 
our research have uncovered are equally worrying: numerous cases of gross neglect or 
recklessness that are not prosecuted because the inherent difficulties in GNM are 
exacerbated by the medical context and further exacerbated by prosecutors’ reluctance 
to prosecute without – to put it crudely – ‘badness’ on the part of the suspect. The 
current law requires proof of ‘bad’ behaviour, not ‘bad’ health care professionals. 
People in medical care are very often weak and suffering from life-threatening 
conditions. This makes causation impossible to prove in many cases. For this reason, 
and because there are equally worrying cases that, by chance, do not end in death, a 
new offence of endangerment is needed. This would be a ‘lesser included’ offence for 
a revised form of GNM that should be subject to published prosecution guidelines – 
an offence with guidelines that had less potential to ensnare the merely unfortunate 
professional, but could still hold the worst practices to account. In many cases a 
shortened investigation into a possible GNM charge would be possible as the 
endangerment offence could be prosecuted instead. Thus closure would be achieved 
in many cases more quickly and more satisfactorily than it is now by the creation of 
an additional offence. We do not ignore the dangers of expanding criminal liability, 
but they would be mitigated if RJ were embraced as an alternative to punitive 
procedures. 
There is a general principle that can be extrapolated from our findings and the 
argument we developed from them: that where particular groups have specific power 
over others there should be a rebuttable presumption that any substantial abuse of that 
power (whether deliberate or not) should be criminalised. Sometimes that power is 
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given by the State (as with the police and army). Sometimes it is a consequence of 
property rights and market power (e.g. landlords and companies). And sometimes it is 
because of their profession, as in the example of health care. And the effect of even 
more extensive criminal liability than there is currently on openness and defensive 
medicine? As one of our lawyer-interviewees said, health care professionals are far 
more worried about GMC and civil proceedings than about criminal prosecution, 
because the latter are so rare in comparison to the former. It is unlikely that our 
proposals, if enacted, would change this significantly. 
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Appendix: Methodology 
 
A series of empirical studies were conducted as part of the wider AHRC project (see  
footnote 3) with three coroner’s courts, police forces, the CPS and relevant lawyers. 
This paper primarily draws on an analysis of medical manslaughter case files drawn 
from the CPS’s SCD. We examined how prosecutors make decisions in these cases, 
how they assess the evidential threshold, and finally, how far justice, deterrence and 
punishment are served by the current system. 
We took a qualitative approach to the case file analysis, in order to gain an in 
depth understanding of the decision making process in cases of medical error. The 
cases all involved registered nurses and doctors employed in private hospitals, the 
NHS and in care homes and covered a six-year time period between 2004-2009. This 
period was used as the CPS did not hold accessible electronic databases on cases 
before 2004. All cases we looked at were closed (i.e. had been concluded). Case files 
consisted of advice files (where early advice on how and if to proceed with an 
investigation had been given to the police on the basis of initial scoping investigations 
rather than full investigation) and full review files (where the CPS had conducted a 
full review of the evidence gathered from a detailed investigation and either decided 
or advised on whether or not to proceed with a prosecution).109  
Cases are filed on their database under the date that the case closed rather than 
when the incident occurred or when the investigation was started. So our sample 
doesn’t include all those cases that occurred but were not completed in that 6 year 
                                                           
109
 The 2003 Act that transferred the power to decide on prosecution to the CPS was brought in 
gradually, so the case sample covered both periods. In practice the police always followed CPS advice 
in these cases so the legal change was not significant for this research. 
Bioethics, medicine and the criminal law: v2: Medicine, Crime and Society. Sanders, A. & 
Griffiths, D. (eds.). Cambridge University Press,p. 117-158 
period (big cases such as the Gosport case, and cases such as Dr Urbani where there 
remained an extradition request) and also includes some cases predating 2004 that 
took a long time to complete (earliest case begun 2001).110 The CPS database also 
does not electronically store these cases under an exclusive category of medical 
manslaughter, rather the CPS had to search through a number of categories including 
death in custody and homicide in order to find these medical cases. Thus while 
seventy-five cases were found and made available to us we cannot be sure that our 
sample includes all the cases that occurred or were closed in that six-year period.111 
We therefore cannot draw any conclusions about any increases or decreases in the 
number of cases referred to the CPS over the six-year period. We also recognise that 
our analysis offers a selected and partial version of events: certain reports and 
correspondence may have been missing and our analysis is affected by our 
interpretive frameworks on them.112 However, the sample of seventy-five cases 
provided enough cases in order to allow a valid analysis of the types of cases the CPS 
received over this period and allowed an in depth exploration of variance within 
prosecutorial decision making. 
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We undertook a qualitative documentary content analysis of the case files. 
Using a coding frame, we grouped various features of the cases into categories for 
comparison (e.g. which test the case fell on and why, what character constructions 
were made about the victim and defendant). We also performed a more quantitative 
analysis including categorising the characteristics of victims and defendants, how the 
case was referred, level of police officer dealing with the case. Again, our aim is not 
to draw statistically robust conclusions from our data but to explore the decision 
making process and gain an indication of patterns.  
Alongside analysis of CPS case file analysis we conducted semi-structured 
interviews with CPS casework lawyers in order to address questions that had arisen 
when analysing particular case files as well as to gain a prosecutors’ perspective of 
the overall process. We spoke to seventeen lawyers of varying experience and 
position (ten in York and seven in London). These interviews sought to give a deeper 
understanding of the overall processes involved in decision-making as well as address 
questions and gaps from within the files.  
